It’s not the size, it’s the relationship: from ‘small states’ to asymmetry by Long, Tom
It’s not the size, it’s the relationship: from 
‘small states’ to asymmetry 
Article 
Accepted Version 
Long, T. (2017) It’s not the size, it’s the relationship: from 
‘small states’ to asymmetry. International Politics, 54 (2). pp. 
144­160. ISSN 1740­3898 doi: https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311­
017­0028­x Available at http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/59064/ 
It is advisable to refer to the publisher’s version if you intend to cite from the 
work. 
Published version at: http://rdcu.be/pfwP 
To link to this article DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/s41311­017­0028­x 
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan 
All outputs in CentAUR are protected by Intellectual Property Rights law, 
including copyright law. Copyright and IPR is retained by the creators or other 
copyright holders. Terms and conditions for use of this material are defined in 
the End User Agreement . 
www.reading.ac.uk/centaur 
CentAUR 
Central Archive at the University of Reading 
Reading’s research outputs online
 1 
 
Original Article  
It’s Not the Size, It’s the Relationship: From ‘Small States’ to Asymmetry 
Tom Long 
Lecturer, School of Politics and International Relations, University of Reading, Whiteknights, Reading, 
Berkshire, RG6 6AA, United Kingdom; Affiliated Professor, Centro de Investigación y Docencia 
Económicas, Mexico City, Mexico 
 
A half century of debate about the definition of ‘small state’ has produced more fragmentation 
than consensus. Though there is impressive and growing empirical and conceptual richness in the 
field of small-state studies, fundamental definitional ambiguity remains a challenge. In particular, 
the lack of clarity over how to understand and delimit the central object of study has hindered 
theory-building, complicated comparison and cumulation, and obfuscated the conversation with 
International Relations theory more broadly. While these problems have been noted by other 
scholars of ‘small states’ (Archer et al., 2014), this article seeks to illuminate the connection 
between those challenges and the definitional debate. More importantly, it calls for an alternative 
approach focused on the dynamics of asymmetrical relationships instead of the amorphous 
category of small (or weak) states, or small (or weak) powers. 
This call comes at what seems to be a zenith for ‘small states.’ Recently, in this journal, 
Matthias Maass (2014) argued that material and normative shifts in the international system have 
facilitated a proliferation of small states; others have noted that globalization and decreased 
external threats allow smaller states to emerge and often thrive (Alesina and Spolaore, 2003). 
Despite the ongoing disagreement about what a ‘small state’ is, the study of international society’s 
diminutive members is also enjoying something of a moment, spurred in part by the conversations 
taking place in this journal. Maass (2009) provided an incisive survey in these pages of the debate 
over what, exactly, constitutes a small state. After noting distinct approaches, he concluded that 
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divergent definitions have facilitated empirical richness, which has been reflected in the 
increasingly agency-focused scholarship of the past two decades. ‘Small states’ have played 
significant roles through joining international organizations (Goetschel, 1998; Thorhallsson, 2010; 
Panke, 2011), propagating norms (Ingebritsen, 2002; He, 2016), shaping global climate 
negotiations (Jaschik, 2014; Deitelhoff and Wallbott, 2012; Benwell, 2011), executing creative 
diplomacy (Cooper and Shaw, 2009), and influencing alliances (Desch, 1993; Rothstein, 1968; 
Risse-Kappen, 1995; Morrow, 1991; Keohane, 1971; Shin et al., 2016). Certainly, these states – 
which by most definitions account for the majority of the world’s states – and their foreign policies 
merit attention (Kassimeris, 2009: 85). However, work on small states has struggled to identify 
important commonalities. The list of foreign policy behaviors ascribed to small states is too long 
to be useful and often contradictory (Hey, 2003a). It seems equally doubtful whether small states 
share common economic challenges. Despite decades of Commonwealth reports concerned with 
the unique problems of a class of ‘small states,’ more comprehensive studies have questioned the 
assumption that small states are more vulnerable than their larger counterparts (Easterly and Kraay, 
2000; Alesina and Spolaore, 2003).  
Small-state studies’ problems of cumulation and conversation with International Relations 
theory are in part attributable to the definitional dilemma. There are no clear-cut lines for 
smallness. As Handel (1981) noted, weakness and strength form ideal-typical endpoints on a 
multifaceted continuum. This continuum, however, holds little analytical purchase for the 
examination of one state; it only applies via comparison.  
It is time for a change of framework. Analysis of ‘small states’ should pivot from the poorly 
specified category of smallness to instead prioritize the dynamics of the relationships in which 
these states are engaged. IR scholars should stop defining and re-defining the concept of ‘small 
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state,’ and set it aside as an analytical category. What matters is not ‘size,’ however defined, but 
the relationships between states. Instead of talking about small and large states, it would be more 
effective to think in terms of asymmetry. This shift, which builds on arguments from Steinmetz 
and Wivel (2010: 7) to ‘shift the focus from the power that states possess to the power that they 
exercise’, would move away from the search for behaviors, strengths, or vulnerabilities amongst 
states as diverse as Switzerland and Mali. A focus on asymmetry facilitates enquiry into how power 
differentials structure relationships, including through methods of (attempted) control, the 
interrelation of power and agendas, and how disparities influence the definition of interests on both 
sides (Womack, 2001; Womack, 2016). We can also examine the limits and possibilities for 
agency on behalf of the weaker party (Long, 2015). Instead of assuming some overall metric for 
size as the relevant variable – falling victim in a different way to what Dahl called the ‘lump-of-
power fallacy,’ (qtd. in Baldwin, 1980: 497) we can better recognize the multifaceted, variegated 
nature of power in international politics. Through the lens of asymmetry, a relationship may be 
overwhelmingly asymmetrical in military terms, but less so economically, diplomatically, or 
institutionally.  
The small-states literature has, of course, explored its subjects’ relationships with great 
powers; however, it has not placed the dynamics of asymmetrical relationships at the center of its 
definitions, categories, or analyses. This article advocates a whole-hearted embrace of a relational 
approach, replacing the analytical category of ‘small state’ with a new perspective and 
terminology. In the context of asymmetrical relationships, it is less useful to speak in terms of large 
and small, which have strong, absolutist connotations. While we can talk about the United States 
and Mexico as having an asymmetrical relationship (Selee and Díaz-Cayeros, 2013), it makes little 
sense to call Mexico – a country of 113 million people with the world’s eleventh-largest economy 
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–  ‘small.’ As Aspinwall and Reich (2016) demonstrated in these pages, the material power 
differential does not always produce the expected outcome. Despite that, asymmetry remains an 
indelible feature of the relationship; one party is preponderant, while the other is comparably 
deficient in specified, relevant resources. For this reason, it is more consistent to speak in terms of 
the ‘preponderant power’ and the ‘hypo-power’ in the relationship.1 A hypo-power is a power ‘in 
a lower degree,’ to quote the Oxford English Dictionary, without necessarily being subordinated. 
‘Hypo’ avoids the connotation of ‘sub-’ that is intentionally evoked in the phrase ‘subaltern 
realism’ (Ayoob, 2003). While the asymmetrical perspective immediately calls to mind bilateral 
relationships, there is no reason that studies of asymmetry need to be limited to two states. 
Similarly to how studies of collective action can be expanded to explore situations with multiple 
actors, an asymmetry-focused approach can examine the dynamics of power differentials amongst 
multiple actors. Recent work on diplomatic signaling is illustrative of one approach to this 
challenge (Trager, 2015). Likewise, the recent International Politics special issue on regional 
contestation to rising powers helpfully illustrated how ‘secondary and tertiary powers’ navigate 
networks of asymmetrical relationships (Lobell et al., 2015; Flemes and Lobell, 2015; Flemes and 
Wehner, 2015). 
The remainder of the article briefly explores the problems of definition and levels of 
analysis in small-state studies. It then proposes an asymmetrical approach, which offers advantages 
for comparison, cumulation, and conversation with IR theory, using the debate on hierarchy as an 
example. Finally, the article describes fundamental questions that an asymmetrical study should 
include, while acknowledging a number of its shortcomings. 
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Of Size and Power: The problem of Definition 
The problem of definition has been exhaustively noted in the study of small states. This article will 
not attempt to comprehensively review the definitional debate. This task has been recently and 
admirably accomplished in these pages by Maass (2009) and Kassimeris (2009: 87-96), and 
elsewhere by Hey (2003c), Neumann and Gstöhl (2006), and Steinmetz and Wivel (2010). 
However, a brief summary is necessary to situate this article’s argument that the debate is linked 
to the limited cumulation, comparison, and conversation with IR, and should be set aside. 
Describing a half century of definitional debates, Maass (2009) notes that there are, and 
perhaps should be, multiple conceptions of the ‘small state’ in IR theory and practice. Small states 
have long been loosely defined in terms of what they are not, or what they do not possess, instead 
of what they are. In European diplomacy, the ‘small state’ emerged as a ‘residual category’ 
between middle powers and microstates (Neumann and Gstöhl, 2006). The definitional battle has 
been central to the study of small states since the late 1960s. Many early definitions set material 
indicators, such as population or territory. These boasted clarity but suffered from arbitrariness, 
and they difficult to adjust for differences in level of wealth, state strength, and other factors. This 
became more noticeable as a new variety of ‘small’ or ‘weak’ state emerged from decolonization. 
Vital (1967) introduced a definition with two population tiers for underdeveloped and developed 
states, mediated with several caveats that left interpretation up to the researcher. Keohane (1969) 
rejected this in favor of an approach that stressed a small state’s ability to influence the 
international system. This would later be echoed by four-part divisions used by scholars of middle 
or rising powers (Mares, 1988). “Scholars create their own definitions and disagree on whether 
absolute or relative power is the key, the nature of influence on neighbors and/or the system, and 
many others factors,” Lobell et al. (2015) recently noted. Qualitative definitions have focused on 
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perceptions – of the small state’s leaders, of other states, or of the scholar. In the absence of a 
common definition, the approach is, to a great extent, ‘I know it when I see it.’  
At a systemic level the attempt to create groupings of small, middle, great, and super 
powers seems intuitively appealing; in practice, the categories have tended to result in grey zones 
with ‘smallness’ depending on context. Fox’s (1959) pioneering book The Power of Small States 
includes, weakened during World War II from its own civil strife. Explicitly or implicitly, 
definitions of ‘small states’ have tried to evaluate smallness through system-wide comparison. 
Handel (1981) eschewed Vital’s attempt at concreteness to instead emphasize a continuum, in 
which all states possess aspects of strength and weakness. Even without a clear definition, scholars 
noted the continued emergence of small states, first as a result of decolonization, followed by 
another wave spurred by the breakup of the Soviet Union and the former Social Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia. 
Maass (2009) described the debate over defining ‘small state’ primarily as a disagreement 
over criteria, with a tension between quantitative and qualitative approaches. However, the 
disagreement is deeper than the qualitative-quantitative divide. The problem has been that we are 
asking the wrong question. Definitional consensus has been elusive because different definitions 
rely on different concepts of power. More recent literature emphasizes the resilience and agency 
of small states, leading to a proliferation of qualified types of power seen from the state level. 
Chong and Maass (2010) advocate evaluating small states in terms of ‘foreign policy power.’ Other 
descriptions of power are drawn from detailed studies of single countries, though it is not always 
clear whether the concepts are generalizable. Qatar has ‘subtle power’ according to one author 
(Kamrava, 2013), and ‘positional power’ according to others (Rubin and Jordan, 2015). Small 
European states might have greater ‘normative power’ (Ingebritsen, 2002; He, 2016), or be 
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particularly ‘smart’ and ‘salient’ (Browning, 2006), while Singapore and the Vatican achieve 
‘virtual enlargement’ through the deft use of soft power (Chong, 2010). Some small states possess 
‘resource power,’ typically based on hydrocarbons (Braveboy-Wagner, 2010; Handel, 1981). One 
recent attempt to address these diverse approaches to power discusses the bases and means of the 
particular-intrinsic, derivative, and collective power in which small states may specialize (Long, 
forthcoming). 
The challenge with applying these and other notions of power to small states is that the 
object of study has already been implicitly defined or selected according to another, less favorable 
concept of power. Despite myriad definitional attempts, the fundamental concept of ‘small state’ 
seems to fall back to a material, resource-based concept of power that presents a mirror image of 
the elements of national power approach prevalent in realism. Small states are defined by their 
lack of these same capabilities. However, the relevance of specified capabilities is highly 
contextual (Steinmetz and Wivel, 2010: 6; Kassimeris, 2009: 91). Markers of population, GDP, or 
military indicators will lose meaning over time or when applied in different geographical contexts. 
As the focus on agency has grown, scholars have often pivoted to alternate concepts of power to 
demonstrate small states’ autonomy, influence, or power.  
While small-state studies is increasingly rich and diverse, cumulation has been 
disappointing. Steinmetz and Wivel (2010: 4) noted:  
Now, as in the past, the study of small states is plagued by a lack of cumulative insights 
and coherent debate. There is no agreement on how we should define a small state, what 
similarities we would expect to find in their foreign policies, or how small states influence 
international relations.’  
The lack of cumulation is directly related to the lack of definition. ‘Indeed, the inherent 
disagreement and contradiction between weak state scholars suggests that failure to arrive at a 
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working definition of what constitutes a weak state has stymied development of a theory of weak 
state foreign policy’ (Reeves, 2014: 257). If we are to generalize findings about ‘small states,’ we 
must be able to set scope conditions. Simply put, to whom do these findings apply? If they are to 
apply to other ‘small states,’ we must be able to identify which states those are. For this reason, 
perhaps, there has been a richer conversation when the small states involved are limited to those 
in Europe (Thorhallsson and Wivel, 2006; Wivel, 2005; Steinmetz and Wivel, 2010; Björkdahl, 
2008; Goetschel, 1998; Nasra, 2011; Rickli, 2008; Thorhallsson, 2010; Hey, 2003b; Ingebritsen, 
2006; Panke, 2011; Panke, 2010). There, the subfield seems to have progressed, while cumulation 
and comparison regarding the rest of the world’s ‘small states’ has been less notable. Lacking 
Europe’s shared institutional structures, worthwhile, individual studies are rarely in conversation 
across regions (for an attempt to remedy this, see Archer et al., 2014). 
Perhaps more problematically, the subfield’s richness has largely produced a one-sided 
conversation with broader debates in IR. While arguing that small-state studies has much to offer 
IR theory, Neumann and Gstöhl (2006: 16) noted its ‘niche position.’ Though she disagreed, Hey 
(2003a) noted that for many scholars definitional difficulties undermine the usefulness of 
“smallness” altogether. The lack of conceptual consensus has limited discussion between those 
who study small states and scholars who question the utility of a subfield that centered on an ill-
defined object of study. Small-state scholars have drawn on broader IR theories or criticized their 
applicability, but the insights from the study of small states do not seem to filter out into a more 
nuanced discussion of international relations. The definitional debate has been a dead end. Worse, 
it has turned the study of small states into cul-de-sac infrequently visited by other IR scholars. It 
is worth considering whether it is time to drop the ‘small state’ paradigm altogether. But what 
would replace it? 
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Moving from size to asymmetry allows a shift in the concept of power that undergirds the 
approach. Resources (material and ideational) remain relevant. However, they now matter in an 
explicitly relational sense, prompting analysts to ask not how ‘scarce’ resources spur common 
behaviors but how power differentials affect the ability to influence or resist influence. Womack 
(2001: 125) notes, ‘asymmetric relationships are normally characterized not only by a disparity of 
resources, but also by mutual, if sometimes implicit, acknowledgment of autonomy. They are 
negotiated relationships, not simply ones of demand and evasion.’ Asymmetry between states in 
diplomacy bears some similarities to warfare between asymmetrical actors. One side possesses a 
preponderance of particular, salient resources; however, preponderance hardly guarantees success. 
Though the preponderant power may initially set the terms of the conflict, the militarily weaker 
actor can adapt and shift the conflict’s nature. Both studies and recent U.S. experiences highlight 
the difficulty in converting resources into outcomes (Maoz, 1989). The preponderant power’s 
‘victory’ depends heavily on its objectives, the resolve of both parties, the context, and the 
strategies employed. Interestingly, in asymmetrical conflicts, it is not the disparity of material 
resources that determines the outcome. In fact, some scholars have suggested that preponderance 
itself produces some of the problems that lead to failure (Sullivan, 2007).  
Clearly, this analogy does not translate perfectly to interstate bargaining and diplomacy. 
However, if preponderance does not guarantee victory in matters of war, where state interests are 
supposedly most closely held, surely it does not guarantee victory elsewhere. Much work in small-
state studies has emphasized this point. Situating these studies within asymmetrical relationships 
will make this clear, while also helping to avoid overstating the influence of small states. For 
example, material asymmetries may be partially offset in disparities in attention, political will, and 
perceptions, with real effects for both agendas and outcomes (Womack, 2016; Shin et al., 2016; 
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Darnton, 2012). This is the essence of Keohane’s admonition, oft-cited by small-state scholars, but 
seemingly ignored elsewhere, that ‘If Lilliputians can tie up Gulliver, or make him do their fighting 
for them, they must be studied as carefully as the giant’ (1969: 310). While this rejoinder highlights 
the importance of dyadic asymmetry, Keohane’s own approach to defining small states was among 
the most explicitly systemic. (Two years later, Keohane (1971) was more bilateral in focus.)  
Let’s Take This to a New Level 
Along with the definitional debate, another small-state bugbear has involved levels of analysis. 
Properly asked, this should be a question about which level is best suited to analyze small states – 
a perspective Chong and Maass (2010) attempt to shift via ‘foreign policy power.’ In other works, 
levels of analysis have been reified, with analysts asking which level has the greatest impact on 
small states.2 This approach, too, asks the wrong question, because it treats a level of analysis as 
something real that affects policy decisions. Each level of analysis can be useful for examining 
particular cases – more in terms of specific decisions than countries’ overall situations, as the levels 
approach has sometimes been applied. On their own, levels do not tell much that seems unique 
about ‘small states’ as a category, nor have they led to much theory building. It might be possible 
to group independent variables by corresponding level, but the resulting categories would likely 
combine factors that held little in common.  
Particularly during the Cold War, numerous scholars emphasized the international 
systemic level as dominating small-state behaviors (El-Anis, 2015: 3-7). Systemic factors have 
been used to highlight the constraints that small states face due to their need to focus on security. 
The arguments about small states’ security resemble those made by neorealists: the international 
structure forces all states to prioritize security and survival. Rothstein (1968) and Handel (1981) 
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analyzed how different international systems have been more or less hospitable for small-state 
survival. It is plausible that a multipolar system would offer small states the ability to maneuver 
between alliances, or that a unipolar system might be more secure. However, it does not seem that 
a systemic analysis, understood through Waltzian notions of systems defined by their polarity, tells 
us a great deal about when small states will survive or wither, as Maass (2014) argued. In practice, 
the greatest threats to small states have little to do with great powers. Instead, most small state 
‘deaths’ were the result of processes of integration of non-great powers; these have been rare for 
the past hundred years. Though territorial threats are less common, power asymmetries remains 
fundamental.  
Economic analyses have also adopted systemic approaches to examine small states’ 
prospects in a globalizing world. Reflecting the heritage of dependency and world systems 
theories, there has often been an emphasis on ‘vulnerability’ to market forces beyond the small 
state’s control (Briguglio et al., 2008). The emphasis, frequently restated in Commonwealth 
Secretariat reports, seems to have outlived its supporting evidence (Secretariat, 1985). 
Katzenstein’s (1985) study of small, corporatist states in Europe provided plenty of room for 
doubt; the economic progress of those same states in the three decades since his book’s publication 
offers more. So, too, do economic analyses, the spread of strong, wealthy, and relatively small (in 
population and territory) states in Asia. With increasing options for regional integration and global 
trade, the handicaps of smallness might be diminishing (Ólafsson, 1998). States small in territory 
and population but large in hydrocarbon and mineral deposits offer a different class of examples 
that question whether small states are necessarily buffeted by the winds of the global economy to 
a greater extent than their larger counterparts. 
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Chong and Maass (2010) argue that at the state level of analysis, the limits and possibilities 
of small states come into focus. This level has been approached differently than in foreign policy 
analyses of larger states, where bureaucratic politics have had more sway (Allison, 1971). With 
their smaller bureaucracies, small states are often presumed to be more cohesive units – ironically, 
closer to a rational, unitary actor than the great powers on which realism has primarily focused. 
The state level has produced some promising findings. The most interesting have related to small 
states’ foreign policy strategies – hiding, binding, and ‘virtual enlargement’ among others (Wivel, 
2010; Chong, 2010). However, these strategies are overwhelmingly related to how small states 
manage multiple asymmetrical relationships. A relational approach can avoid arbitrary divisions 
based on population or other measures and emphasizes commonalities based on a state being 
considerably the smaller/weaker in a dyadic relationship (Baldacchino, 2009).  
The individual level of analysis is perhaps the most idiosyncratic, in small states or 
otherwise. Hey (2003c) asks whether the individual is more important in the foreign policy of 
small states than larger ones, given the lower levels of bureaucratization. In the study of Latin 
American foreign policy, for example, various authors have emphasized the outsized importance 
of presidentialism in foreign policy, as a result of size, institutional underdevelopment, or a 
political culture that emphasizes caudillos (Hey, 1997; Giacalone, 2012; Mora and Hey, 2003; 
Russell and Tokatlian, 2009; Cason and Power, 2009). However, it hardly seems clear that 
individual leaders are more dominant in small Latin American states than Vladimir Putin is in 
Russian foreign policy. Cognitive FPA has advanced the understanding of how leaders are 
influence by biases, group dynamics, cognitive shortcuts, and risk aversion, but none of these 
would seem to be unique to small-state leaders. There could be patterns – perhaps leaders of small 
states tend to be more or less risk averse – but to date they have not been identified.  
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The argument here is not only about abandoning the definitional debate, but about situating 
those states formerly known as small within a different level of analysis – starting with the dyad. 
The dyadic level of analysis emphasizes the pairing of relevant actors, which are likely, but not 
necessarily, states. As bodies of research on the democratic peace and patterns of militarized 
conflict have demonstrated, the dyadic level can allow scholars to meaningfully cumulate very 
different states to find patterns amongst their relationships (Kinsella and Russett, 2002). In this 
case, the relationship of interest is not between a ‘small state,’ however defined, and every other 
state in the world. Rather it is between a state that possesses dramatically fewer elements of 
national power than the other state in the pairing – a hypo-power and a preponderant power. The 
relationship is asymmetrical, though this does not presume domination or unidirectional influence. 
The dyadic level of analysis allows for a more multifaceted treatment of power than lump 
categories of small, medium, and large. One might synthesize various aspects of power into an 
index, but the result would be one-dimensional. This index would struggle to capture a situation 
in which state A has a larger military than state B, while state B possesses a more developed 
economy and stronger alliance ties. It is not clear which state is ‘larger;’ more importantly it is not 
clear which state is better suited to exercise relational power. This will depend on the context and 
the objectives sought. More concretely, Bangladesh has a population fifteen times larger than 
Sweden, but if the relevant aspect of the relationship concerns garment production, population may 
not be an advantage over the Scandinavian home of global retailers like H&M. 
Though the dyadic level refers to pairs, its logic is not limited to examining two states at a 
time. A state’s connections with allies are likely to be an important aspect of its relational power 
– the ability to both change the behaviors of other actors and to resist changes in its own behavior 
when under pressure from others. We can examine asymmetries among combinations of states, 
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moving from dyads to triads and beyond. For example, Cooley’s recent studies of Central Asia 
have emphasized how these leaders use multiple asymmetrical relationships for state, regime, and 
personal advantage (Cooley, 2014; see also Strakes, 2013). We can reasonably apply a dyadic 
focus beyond state-to-state relations, too. For example, we can examine aspects of asymmetry 
between a small state and the International Monetary Fund. Asymmetries could range from dollar 
reserves to bureaucratic economic expertise.  
Though asymmetry has not been utilized widely as an organizing principle, studies of 
‘small states’ have included relational aspects, focused especially on alliance behavior and 
autonomy. Many studies of alliance behavior initially argued that small states should bandwagon 
with a rising, larger power, given that their contribution to the balance of power would be 
inconsequential. That picture has grown increasingly complicated, with scholars showing how 
small states engage in a variety of behaviors, such as binding, ‘leash-slipping,’ ‘entangling 
diplomacy’ (Lobell et al., 2015; Flemes and Wehner, 2015), or ‘soft balancing’ (Friedman and 
Long, 2015; Whitaker, 2010). Starting with Fox (1959), there has been considerable attention to 
whether small states can retain a degree of autonomy from the pressures of great powers. Just as 
much of IR theory has assumed power as the overriding goal of great powers, scholars have 
assumed autonomy to be the overriding goal of small states in asymmetrical relationships. 
Steinmetz and Wivel consider autonomy and influence to be oppositional for small states in 
asymmetrical relationships, but the dichotomy is not inevitable. Reviewing the treatment of the 
Global South, Braveboy-Wagner and Snarr (2003) note that early attempts to demonstrate that 
core powers determined the foreign policies of ‘dependent’ states – either through compliance, 
consensus, or cooptation of dependent-country elites – provided weak evidence. The literature 
indicates that ‘regimes of dependent states have significant latitude in their foreign policy,’ and 
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that many might adopt ‘counterdependent’ strategies for reasons of ideology or domestic politics 
(Braveboy-Wagner and Snarr, 2003). Studies of Latin American IR, comprised of hypo-powers in 
proximity to a preponderant power, have described autonomy as a central foreign policy goal 
(Russell and Tokatlian, 2003; Burges, 2009; Vigevani and Cepaluni, 2007). Instead of giving 
implicit normative value to autonomy, framing the study of small states’ foreign policy in terms 
of influence under asymmetry allows us to consider that, as Carlos Escudé (1997) advocated, small 
states’ leaders might more effectively achieve their goals through either confrontation or some 
degree of cooperation. Baltic states must manage their relations with Russia on the one hand and 
the NATO powers on the other – balancing one by binding with the other (Hamilton, 2008; 
Crandall, 2014). In other words, it is the management of multiple asymmetrical relationships.  
Despite the frequent implicit focus, the concept of ‘asymmetry’ and its implications has 
not been central to IR, with the significant exception of work by Womack. However, a particular 
mutation of asymmetry has garnered significant recent attention – hierarchy. The paradigmatic 
example of this has been the work of David Lake (Lake, 1996; Lake, 2009; Donnelly, 2006), 
complement by cogent research on military basing (Cooley and Nexon, 2013; Bitar, 2015). Lake 
(2009: 179-180) notes that his theory of hierarchy is dyadic, and much of his discussion of 
hierarchy concerns the relationships between superpowers and those that might be labeled ‘small.’ 
Hierarchy in Lake’s terms requires an acceptance of the legitimacy of the commands of the 
dominant state, but it is practically based on power asymmetries that allow the dominant state to 
threaten coercion or grant and withdraw benefits to ‘subordinate’ states. Asymmetry is not 
sufficient for the creation of a hierarchical relationship, but it would seem to be necessary. 
Hierarchy, in the conception of Lake and others who have complemented his work (Butt, 2013; 
Clark, 2009), is a type of social contract between states. There is a ‘conferral of rights by the ruled’ 
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(Lake, 2009: 8). In international hierarchy, subordinated states exchange aspects of their 
sovereignty for benefits, most often security. 
There are two reasons why discussing asymmetry is more broadly useful than limiting 
ourselves to hierarchy. The first reason rests in the lack of sufficiency between the two concepts. 
The observance of asymmetry of material capabilities does not allow the analyst to imply the 
existence of a hierarchical relationship. Though Lake tries to impute this through various proxies, 
a relationship is only truly hierarchical if legitimacy can be established – that the weaker state has 
conferred rights to the preponderant power. Empirically, this is a tall order, particularly given that, 
as Lake notes, the boundaries and dynamics of hierarchical relations are often contested and in 
flux. The second reason is the study of hierarchy has tended to negate the agency of the weaker 
party (Long, 2015: 13-18).  
An asymmetrical approach leads the analyst to different questions and allows for 
categorizing relationships based on what contextually matters instead of sorting states by measures 
of ‘size’ of inconsistent importance. A preponderant power’s tremendous military may not always 
be helpful for understanding the nature of a relationship. For the United States and Canada, this 
feature of asymmetry is less relevant than it is for the asymmetrical relationship between China 
and Taiwan. We may advance different hypotheses about relations of military asymmetry than 
those of asymmetrical interdependence. This has often occurred implicitly within the robust 
subfield on small states in Europe, where numerous authors have argued that the absence of 
existential or territorial threats allows qualitatively different foreign policies and levels of 
influence (Grøn and Wivel, 2011; Thorhallsson, 2010). The European Union is treated as a case 
apart, emphasizing ‘the main opportunities offered by the European integration process’ 
(Steinmetz and Wivel, 2010: 218). From a perspective of asymmetry, similar dynamics could 
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apply within NATO (Risse-Kappen, 1995) or perhaps even between Brazil and Uruguay in the 
less institutionalized Mercosur.  
The degree of military threat is not the only relevant way to categorize asymmetrical 
relationships. Relationships with differing levels of interdependence might demonstrate 
identifiable patterns (Keohane and Nye, 1977). Proximity is likely to matter; regional versus extra-
regional asymmetrical relationships might differ in consistent ways. Lake attempts to identify 
characteristics of hierarchical relationships that differ from anarchical ones; to the extent truly 
hierarchical relationships can be identified, different patterns of behavior are likely to exist. Hypo-
powers will likely pursue dramatically different approaches in pursuit of their interests.  
Application of Asymmetrical Analysis 
An asymmetrical focus can facilitate greater cumulation and conversation with other IR scholars. 
However, these benefits will be greatly enhanced if there is, at least to an extent, a common 
framework for analysis. How should we study asymmetrical relations? Where should we look for 
its effects of asymmetry? How should we understand efforts to influence within asymmetry? To 
use Barnett and Duvall’s (2005) framework on power, it would be simple to focus on visible 
exercises of compulsory power – the understanding of power often linked to Dahl (1957). Interests, 
agendas, and actions may all be affected by overt pressures. However, the effects of asymmetry, 
like power itself, are multifaceted. Direct and diffuse manners of power must be considered. 
Recognizing these effects and incorporating them into the analysis will mitigate some of the 
disadvantages of the approach, attending to less easily observable effects of power on agendas, 
interests, and non-decisions. Analysis of asymmetrical relationships should focus on interests, 
agendas, strategies, interactions, and outcomes. 
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Asymmetry is likely to affect the formation and definition of national interests, most 
notably those of the hypo-power, through various mechanisms. Interests respond to a state’s 
current situation, which is likely colored by asymmetry. This does not mean those interests are 
predetermined by power imbalances, or dictated by the preponderant power. The hypo-power 
could define its interests in terms of enhancing autonomy vis-à-vis the preponderant power; 
conversely, it could prioritize other interests and try to ally itself more closely. On the other hand, 
a preponderant power’s interests and even identity can be constituted through its relationships with 
hypo-powers, which could allow smaller states to draw preponderant powers into local conflicts 
(Shoemaker and Spanier, 1984) or to include themselves in dominant framings of security (Jourde, 
2007). Responding to similar asymmetrical relationships with the United States in the late 1940s 
and 1950s, Somoza-ruled Nicaragua sought close ties and U.S. support, Guatemala sought greater 
autonomy (ultimately unsuccessfully), and Costa Rica achieved significant room for maneuver 
while still benefiting from U.S. security protection (Gleijeses, 1991; Clark, 1992; Longley, 1997). 
There is little question the interests and strategies of all three were shaped by how their key 
asymmetrical relationship structured their incentives, but they were also molded by regime type, 
domestic politics, and institutional trajectories.  
Secondly, asymmetrical analyses should examine the agenda between the involved actors, 
asking how issues are prioritized and to what extent these reflect the interests of the preponderant 
power and the hypo-power. As Keohane and Nye (1977) noted in describing complex 
interdependence, the central priority of a hypo-power may be peripheral to the preponderant 
power. This point has also been made in recent work on asymmetry (Womack, 2016: 47-51). As 
an effect of asymmetry, smaller states will struggle to exclude from the agenda an issue of central 
importance to the preponderant power, but may have to engage in agenda-setting in order to raise 
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the profile of an issue. As Kingdon (1984) wrote, getting one’s issue defined as a problem is itself 
a political victory.  
By starting with interests, as defined in an asymmetrical context, we can examine how 
hypo-powers pursue their goals. Reversing the eternal logic of Thucydides, one might ask: When 
and how can ‘the weak’ do what they wish? In this aspect, the expanding literature on small-state 
strategies is particularly relevant. How do states’ strategic choices vary depending on the nature 
of the asymmetrical relationship? How do they vary according to issue area? Because the same 
state may have multiple, salient asymmetrical relationships, we can compare when it chooses one 
strategy over others in a particular context. The examination of the actions of both the preponderant 
power and the hypo-power should be rooted in a cogent approach to the study of relational power. 
Dahl’s (1957) framework for the study of power can be applied beyond compulsory power to 
examine the base, means, scope, and amount of actors’ power. In the typical small state/great 
power division, the focus has been on a narrowly defined base. Instead, we should problematize 
the bases of power, and ask how the bases of the preponderant power and the hypo-power differ. 
Ingebritsen (2002) demonstrates how ideational and identity factors can be a base of power for 
Scandinavian states. Unique economic resources can also be a base for small states. The issue of 
means is closely linked to the strategies above, and will also differ depending on the goal. 
Regarding scope and amount, it has often been assumed that ‘small states’ have interest and ability 
to affect only a very narrow range of issues to a minimal degree. However, in an asymmetrical 
approach, these questions can be approached in terms of the conditions under which hypo-powers 
can exercise influence. What are the limits and possibilities for influence under asymmetry? 
Finally, while the asymmetrical approach is intuitively bilateral, it could be especially useful if 
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combined with forms of network analysis. The asymmetrical focus would help emphasize the 
importance of power – particularly unequal distributions of power – in networks. 
Despite these advantages, an asymmetrical perspective does have weaknesses. While it is 
useful for evaluating the foreign policy of a given state and comparing foreign policies, structural 
factors as such are less visible. Some aspects of major systemic changes, such as the end of the 
Cold War, can be understood through hypo-powers’ asymmetrical relationships with preponderant 
powers. Global structures, like those described by Susan Strange (1987) will be less salient through 
an asymmetrical lens if these structures are, in fact, outside the observable policies of the 
preponderant power. These structures might still affect the agenda, formulation of interests, and 
strategies of both parties. Secondly, the asymmetrical focus as developed here is state-centric, and 
in particular focuses attention on the foreign policies and diplomacies of the states involved. In 
practice, these will often involve international organizations and even non-state actors, but these 
will tend to be ‘instrumentalized’ or treated as aspects of foreign policy strategies or sites for 
negotiation as opposed to independent actors. 
Conclusions 
Attempts to define ‘small states’ and to search for common characteristics in terms of 
opportunities, limitations, and behaviors have not produced sufficient consensus or cumulation. 
This has not stopped the production of interesting work, particularly insightful country and 
regional studies. However, attempts to compare cross-regionally underline the differences between 
various ‘small states.’ While relations with great powers have been, unavoidably, an important 
part of small-state studies, this serves to underline the point. While many of studies of ‘small states’ 
respond to and draw on broader strands of IR theory, the communication seems to have been one 
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way, with fewer explorations of how small states shape the behaviors of great powers (exceptions 
include Mearsheimer and Walt, 2007; Keohane, 1971).  
Studying the dynamics of asymmetrical relationships offers better prospects for 
comparison, cumulation, and conversation. The focus coincides with the fundamentally relational 
approach to power that, in practice, already dominates the subfield. Because ‘smallness’ is, perhaps 
inextricably, linked with the scarcity of resources associated with a realist elements of national 
power approach, it has required scholars to jump through conceptual hoops to highlight other forms 
of power. Defining the object of study as the asymmetrical relationship – dyadically or through 
networks of relationships – is consistent with the concept of power needed to explore the agency 
of ‘small states.’ An explicit focus on asymmetry brings ‘small states’ into more nuanced 
conversations about power in IR. To break the connection between definition and resource 
possession, this article has advocated a switch in terminology from ‘small’ and ‘large’ to 
preponderant powers and hypo-powers. More important than the semantics, however, is to switch 
to a perspective that departs not from the point of weakness but from the notion that the actions of 
states formerly known as small are relevant, and perhaps central, to understanding the actions of 
preponderant powers – and international relations more broadly. 
An asymmetrical focus has important advantages over previous approaches focused on 
absolute smallness. It directly engages with IR debates about power and influence. It places the 
subfield in discussion with scholars who are more interested in great powers and offers important 
insights into relationships that have been examined under the rubric of hierarchy. Examining 
diverse asymmetrical relationships will allow for comparison and cumulation that has thus far been 
in short supply by providing new ways to examine ‘small states’ across the world. The questions 
coming from this approach could include: What are the characteristics of given relationships that 
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promote or limit influence? What strategies do these states share, and how are they conditioned by 
asymmetrical relational dynamics? 
This is not a call to start over, or to jettison sixty years of scholarship, but to build on those 
insights in a different way. Much of what has been learned in small-state studies is relevant to the 
dynamics of asymmetrical relationships and to how hypo-powers manage these relationships. This 
is particularly true with regards to recent studies of foreign policies and strategies. An 
asymmetrical focus will amplify the utility of that work by providing a structure for comparison. 
The scope conditions of this work – the states to which it could be expected to generalize – have 
been stuck in part on the lack of definition. Identifying salient characteristics of the relationships 
involved offers a new way to generalize. We should keep studying small states, but it is time to for 
a changed perspective. 
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Endnotes 
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1 While the opposition of hyper-power and hypo-power is appealing, the term ‘hyper-power,’ coming from the 
former French Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine’s hyperpuissance, has a strong connection with the United States 
as the world’s sole hyper-power. 
2 This mistake is made in the organization of the contributions to Hey 2003, as well as in earlier works like Handel 
1981. 
                                                          
